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Abstract 
 
In our paper we analyze the heterogeneity between various business models among 
systemically important banks in 65 countries over the period of 2000-2012. For the first time, 
we are able to identify true banking strategies consisting of different combinations of bank 
asset and funding sources and assess their impact on the mortgage crisis. We then estimate 
how distinct strategies have affected bank profitability and risk before the crisis, and what 
impact they have put on the mortgage crisis. Our results prove that the asset structure of banks 
was responsible for the systemic risk before the mortgage crisis, whereas the liability structure 
was responsible for the crisis itself. Finally, we show that countries with banks that rely on 
investment activities experienced a greater but more short-lived drop in GDP compared to 
countries that have a predominantly traditional banking sector.  
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1.#Introduction#
 
The mortgage crisis has revealed that the general knowledge concerning bank activity 
undertaken by banks is limited. Regulators admitted that they lacked sufficient and reliable 
knowledge of banks’ activities, which hampered their accurate assessment of banking sector 
risk and timely react to the banking sectors’ problems during the mortgage crisis (Lo, 2009; 
McCarthy et al., 2010). Second and more importantly, banks themselves lost their grasp of 
their general level of risk. The Risk Management Officer of one of the largest banks admitted 
in one press conference that “he was not aware of some bank practices” (Frankfurt am Main, 
December, 2010). 
 
This situation occurred because the complexity and size of banks have considerably increased 
recently. Banks have become more tied to the capital market performance and mutually 
interlinked with each other, and their products became more complex (Boot and Thakor, 
2009; Borio and Drehmann, 2009; Song and Thakor, 2010). In some countries banks’ size has 
exceeded the country’s size in terms of GDP, for example in Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland. Banking business models have also changed and became more heterogeneous 
than ever before. This has been particularly observable among global banks. Whereas the 
asset and liability structure of banks such as UBS, ING, Deutsche Bank, and Citibank 
exhibited an investment banking model, consisting mainly of trading assets and market 
funding, other banks have decided to follow alterative strategies. For example, the largest 
Chinese and Japanese banks such as Industrial and Commercial Bank of China or Sumitomo 
Mitsui, and Mitsubishi UFI decided to follow the trading asset structure while simultaneously 
maintaining the traditional structure of their liabilities. In contrast, Norwegian or Austrian 
banks retained a more diversified structure on both the asset and liability side, whereas 
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Brazilian banks mostly exhibited the traditional banking structure. Consequently, Gropp and 
Heider (2010) document that before the mortgage crisis there was substantial heterogeneity in 
the level of banks capital in various countries, which is not explained by the capital 
requirements, but rather by banks’ specific features.  
 
In our study, we consider how different combinations of asset and liability structure within a 
banking business model affected their risk-return profile as well as the correlation with the 
nature of crisis in individual countries. More specifically, we try to answer the following 
questions: How do various banking business models contribute to a financial crisis and its 
systemic risk effect, and how risky and profitable are they? Finally, do banking strategies 
affect the nature of the financial crisis in an individual country, and, if so, how?  
 
Analyzing the literature, the answers to these questions are not very obvious. According to the 
theoretical literature the universal model is the one, which allows banks to boost their 
profitability, simultaneously limiting their risk. Therefore, it should render a positive effect on 
bank’s business. However the mortgage crisis has documented that not all banks and countries 
following the universal model were resistant to consequences of the mortgage crisis. In fact, 
the heterogeneity in banks’ and countries’ affection by global distress was significant.  
 
Neither the empirical literature presents the unambiguous results to our questions. Some 
studies point toward the separation of commercial and investment banking activities arguing 
that universal model tends to use capital inefficiently to cross-subsidize marginal or loss-
making projects, draining resources from healthy business (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Laeven 
and Levine, 2009). This stream of literature also shows that investment business is more risky 
than any other banks activities, and thus banks should be restricted to render them (Demirgüç-
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Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Shleifer and Vishny, 2010; Diamond and Rajan, 2011; Beltratti and 
Stulz, 2012; Brunnermeier et al., 2012; Fahlenbrach et al., 2012). Also, the economy of scale 
and scope characterizing predominantly universal model caused banks to increase in size and 
complexity increasing the global systemic risk (Brunnermeier et al., 2012). In turn, other 
studies point toward stabilizing role of universal banking model pointing out its 
diversification effects, and thus its reduced exposure toward individual and domestic systemic 
risk (Saunders and Walter, 1994; 2012; Buch et al., 2013). However this stream of literature 
documents that investment banking activities may provide substantial diversification effects 
for bank’s entire business, and thus should not be entirely eliminated from the scope of 
commercial banks’ activities (Boost and Ratnovski, 2012).  
 
Given a large heterogeneity between recent banking business models, in fact, we know very 
little about the effect of banking models on bank profitability and risk. The above cited 
studies, though they provide important insight into banking business, they do not assess 
banking business models entirely, controlling for various scale of bank individual activities, 
correlation within as well as between bank asset and liability structure. For example, although 
we know that bank non-interest activities, especially investment ones become the riskiest 
while they are funded by short-term sources, we still do not know how risky they will become 
once they are funded by deposits. Additionally, the combination of non-interest sources and 
liability sources that is the riskiest in a banking business becomes unclear. Furthermore, these 
existing shortcomings do not allow us to capture the non-linear effects of bank individual 
activities on profitability and riskiness of specific banking models. Finally, to the best of our 
knowledge there are no empirical studies examining the contribution of individual banking 
models to the systemic crises. More specifically, analyzing banking model riskiness it is 
important to know how individual banking strategies contribute to the nature of crisis in 
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individual countries – its duration and deepness as well as systemic effects. Consequently, 
sole assessment of bank individual activities is not sufficient to formulate any policy-making 
conclusions. More important is to know how these activities behave in a portfolio context, 
that is with a specific bank’s asset and/or liability structure. Without the answers to these 
questions, banking regulations inadequately address the potential problems in the banking 
industry and, at the same time, cannot ensure financial stability. This paper addresses above 
problems existing in the current literature.  
 
To answer our research questions we investigate the characteristics and risk-return profile of 
458 systemically important banks coming from 65 countries during the 2000-2012. In 
addition, we test the contribution of these models to global systemic risk, and the nature of 
financial crises in individual countries. Our analysis offers three important contributions to 
the existing literature. First, using the k-medoid clustering approach, we empirically select 
banks with different asset and liability structures. More specifically, the methodology allows 
us to cluster the banks with similar asset and liability exposure into one group. At the same 
time, we create different groups for these banks, which do not exhibit the same 
characteristics. Additionally, the sample banks categorized into groups may change in 
different sample periods (pre-crisis and crisis periods) if their business model has also 
changed. Importantly, this methodology, in contrast to other studies, assumes that banking 
business models are created empirically as a function of the bank’s asset and liability 
structure, and therefore the business model is not assumed to be given. This approach 
distinguishes this study from other empirical papers and allows us to capture the 
heterogeneity between entire banking business models. Consequently, we address the non-
linear nature of financial variables on bank risk-return profiles. Additionally, the model 
allows us to determine how the correlation of different asset exposures with specific liability 
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sources directly affects the risk-return profile of banks. Second, in comparison to other 
studies, we extend the sample in both directions – the number of banks as well as considered 
time periods - to determine the risk-return profile of banking strategies. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2010) examine the individual risk and return of different bank characteristics for a 
sample of 1,334 banks from 101 countries from the year 1999 until the end of 2008. Beltratti 
and Stulz's (2012) study on performance examined the stock returns of large banks from 32 
countries. The period of analysis included the year prior to the mortgage crisis and the 2007 to 
2008 crisis period. Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) analyzed bank characteristics and their effect on 
bank stock returns during the financial crisis of 1998 as well as during the recent financial 
crisis. The study sample included 347 publicly listed US financial institutions. Notably, our 
analysis period spans the years 2000 to 2012 – well beyond that of existing studies. Moreover, 
we also consider all systemically important institutions included in the V-LAB list since 2000. 
Our extended sample better captures the banking business models and their changes pre- and 
post-crisis. Finally, to the best knowledge of our knowledge, this is the first study to 
investigate how different banking business models affect the nature of financial crises in 
individual countries that is, the crisis depth and duration.   
 
The results, using k-medoids, identify four banking strategies that simultaneously control the 
asset and funding structure: two banking models within a traditional group and two banking 
models among non-traditional entities. Consequently, within the former group we found a 
more diversified model as well as a specialized model, whereas within the latter we found a 
trader model as well as an investment model. Banks belonging to the respective groups differ 
in terms of their asset structure and liability structure mix. Our empirical results concerning 
the riskiness of the models confirm those of some studies that diversification matters for 
banks because it allows them to reduce their individual risk (Wagner, 2007; Brunnermeier et 
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al., 2012; Buch et al., 2013). The result is consistent for the pre-crisis period and the crisis 
periods. The results also show that investment model risk is difficult to detect and thus 
understated most likely because of a high level of off-balance sheet activities and derivatives 
not reported in the regulatory capital. With respect to systemic risk, our results suggest that 
traditional banks are less risky than their nontraditional counterparts; however, we could not 
find any differences within the individual banking groups. This result would point toward 
significant policy implications because it suggests that asset structure and not liability 
structure was responsible for systemic risk before the mortgage crisis (the banks between the 
banking groups differ in terms of asset structure; however within a group the banks differ in 
terms of funding sources). By contrast, our empirical investigation documents however 
different results during the mortgage crisis. Consistent with studies such as Gorton and 
Metrick (2012), we prove that the liability structure was the main driver of systemic risk 
during the mortgage crisis. We find that the investment model was the riskiest and was even 
riskier than the trader model. The low share of deposits in banks that represents that model, 
and the consequent illiquidity problems after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, materialized 
bank losses causing bankruptcies. However, the high level of interconnectedness among 
institutions following the investment model resulted in the banks’ simultaneous problems 
during the financial crisis. This evidence explains at least partially, why the systemic risk was 
not observable before the mortgage crisis. Banks with the same asset structure but different 
liability structure distorted the measures of the true systemic risk. Although the bank 
investment strategies were largely responsible for the bank losses and thus the systemic nature 
of the crisis, we find that the crisis in countries with investment business model dominance 
was deeper; however, the crisis was short-lived. In contrast, the countries whose banks rely 
predominantly on traditional banking experienced less of a reduction in GDP; however, the 
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crisis was longer in duration. Our results seem to be robust and independent from the financial 
structure on which countries rely.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the empirical strategy and the data set. 
Section 3 presents the results on banking business models’ identification, and Section 4 shows 
the results of estimations of their riskiness. Section 5 documents the link between the banking 
business models and their profitability, and Section 6 documents the relationship between 
various banking business models and the nature of financial crises in crises. We present the 
conclusions in Section 7.  
2. Data#and#empirical#methodology#
2.1. Data#set#and#the#banking#business#models##
 
To test our research question concerning the riskiness and profitability of various banking 
business models, we use a sample of all systemically important banks listed on the V-LAB list 
between 2000 and 2012. To classify a bank as systemically important it was sufficient for us 
that a bank has been identified on the list at least once since 2000. In total, our sample 
consists of 458 banks from 65 countries and sample period covers the years of 2000-2012. 
Then using the k-medoid clustering we assign each bank to a specific banking business model 
given their asset and liability structure using k-medoid approach. The objective of the k-
medoid is to group banks with a similar asset and liability structure into the same cluster, and 
banks with different characteristics to classify into different clusters (Kaufman and 
Rousseeuw, 1990). K-medoid approach identifies a cluster by minimizing the difference 
between individual financial variables of different banks using Euclidean distance. For the 
purpose of our analysis we perform the grouping based on earning asset and liability sources. 
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Among bank asset structure we distinguish such positions as: loans to entities other than 
banks, loans and advances to banks, volume of the securities held by banks, and other earning 
asset. All of them are scaled by bank total asset. Among bank funding sources we distinguish: 
deposit and short-term funding, other interest bearing liabilities, and non-interest bearing 
liability. All liability positions are scaled by total sum of bank’s liabilities. The differences in 
the dominance of individual asset and liability variables in our sample banks would point 
toward differences in banking models. All bank-level financial data come from Bankscope. 
We prefer to use clusters from the balance sheet data as opposed to the income statements as 
they are not hampered by business cycles or monetary policy and thus, we argue that more 
accurately reflect the changes between the individual banking models. Importantly, we allow 
banks to change the strategy between our sample periods (pre-crisis and post-crisis period). 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for clustering variables.  
[Table 1 about here] 
To verify the impact of a banking model on a bank’s individual and systemic risk and 
profitability measures, we use the equity-to-assets ratio (EQUITY) and Tier 1 capital ratio 
(TIER1) as individual risk measures, and ROA and ROE as profitability ratios. EQUITY and 
TIER1 are widely used measures of an individual bank’s risk but, in some circumstances, 
these measures can deviate from the real risk borne by a given institution. For example, 
EQUITY does not incorporate off-balance sheet items, whereas TIER1 is influenced by the 
regulator’s requirements, which proved not to be perfect during the recent crisis. With respect 
to the measure of systemic risk (SRISK), we use values quoted by V-LAB. The values 
represent equity risk at the end of each year and were calculated as expected capital shortfall 
of the bank in the event of another crisis. The measure incorporates the volatility of the bank’s 
market value, its correlation with the market, and its performance in extreme contexts.1  
                                                
1 For details on systemic risk measures by the Volatility Institute of New York University Stern School of 
Business, please visit: http://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/doc?topic=mdls. 
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In the final step of our research, we analyze the effect of an existence of country’s banking 
model on the depth and duration of the crisis from the year 2007 to 2012. At this end we 
calculate the average asset-weighted share of banks belonging to the most prevalent banking 
business model identified for each country during the crisis period. A crisis depth is defined 
as a ratio of two values: a) a difference between a country’s GDP growth rate in 2006 and the 
lowest yearly GDP growth rate in the period of 2007-2012, and b) a country’s GDP growth 
rate in 2006. However crisis duration is defined as maximum of two values: a) a number of 
years between 2006 and the last year with negative GDP growth rate, and b) a number of 
years between 2006 and the year with the minimum GDP growth rate in the period of 2007-
2012. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for bank and country variables used in our 
analysis.  
[Table 2 about here] 
2.2. Empirical#strategy#
 
To test the relationship between banking business models, profitability, individual risk, and 
systemic risk we apply the GLS estimator with random effects. We run regressions separately 
for each of the two sub-periods (2000 to 2006 and 2007 to 2012). The banking business 
models are included into the regression as dummies. We run regressions with three out of four 
business model dummies because four banking model dummies taken at the same time are 
collinear. Additionally, in line with the existing studies in each regression we also control for 
bank’s and country’s characteristics (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 2010). The bank-level controls include bank’s size (in natural logarithm), liquidity 
ratio and cost to income. However to reflect the stage of the economic cycle within which 
profitability and risk are measured we use country’s GDP growth rate as a country’s control. 
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Finally, to check that country’s institutional structure does not interfere our standard results, 
we include country-specific institutional variables – bank asset concentration, banking sector 
size, and stock market capitalization – as a share of a country’s GDP (Čihák et al., 2012). 
Additionally, we cluster the standard errors of our estimations on a bank’s level.  
 
The general construction of our panel model is the following:  
 
      (1) 
 
where:  
DEPit represents the dependent variable calculated for bank i in year t (EQUITY, TIER1, 
ROA, ROE, or SRISK); BANKit-1 represents a set of bank characteristics including size 
(LN_A) and some financial ratios; MODELit-1 represents a set of banking business model 
dummies, and COUNTRYkt includes country-specific variables for country k at time t in 
which bank i is incorporated. 
 
To answer the question how individual banking business models affect the nature of financial 
crisis in individual countries we run a cross-section OLS model in which crisis depth and 
crisis duration are regressed against a country’s business model. Additionally, to ensure that 
the effect of a banking business model on the nature of a crisis does not depend on 
institutional infrastructure a country relies upon, we include country-specific institutional 
variables as banking sector concentration, the size of banking sector and capital market.  
 
The description of all dataset is presented in the Appendix 1.  
( )ktititit COUNTRYMODELBANKfDEP ;; 11 −−=
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3. Banking)business)models’)specifications))
 
In this section we present the clustering results on banking business models. Panel A and 
Panel B of Table 3 present the clustering estimations based on earning asset structure and 
funding structure, respectively. However Panel C presents cluster results using both asset and 
liability variables simultaneously.   
[Table 3 about here] 
In Panel A, four different clusters reflecting distinct asset structure between the banks can be 
found. They can be divided into two groups. One is the traditional group of banks, which 
generates earnings from loans to households and companies (cluster A3) or loans in general 
(including loans to other banks, as in cluster A1), and the other is the nontraditional group of 
banks, with banks that possess a high proportion of securities shares (cluster A4) or both 
securities and other earning assets (cluster A2). Panel B presents differences between banking 
business model depending on banks’ liability structure. Again, we can notice that there are 
banks which mostly funded their activities by deposits and short-term liabilities (clusters B1 
and B2) and those who preferred less traditional sources of funding (clusters B3 and B4).  
 
The most comprehensive results, incorporating earning asset structure and funding structure 
simultaneously, are presented in Panel C. Given above we can identify two nontraditional 
models in clusters C2 and C4, and two traditional models in clusters C1 and C3.  
 
More specifically, cluster C4 seems to resemble the trader model because its dominant 
feature is the highest share of securities in earning assets. However, this cluster’s funding 
structure is traditional because it is composed predominantly of deposits and short-term 
liabilities. Consequently, the trader model shows that a nontraditional asset structure is not 
necessarily related to capital market funding. This could however generate additional risk for 
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that model. In our sample the trader model is represented by 136 institutions (32%) in the 
pre-crisis period, and 112 (25%) banks in the crisis period. Banks following this model 
include the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Agricultural 
Bank of China, Sumitomo Mitsui, Mitsubishi UFJ, Mizuho, Wachovia, State Bank of India, 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, Sberbank, and the National Bank of Greece.  
 
Cluster C2 seems to exhibit a nontraditional asset structure with nontraditional funding. This 
structure resembles the investment model. A high proportion of other earning assets (which 
includes derivatives), a substantial portion of securities, and an unremarkable ratio of loans to 
total earning assets characterizes this model. With respect to funding, this cluster is 
represented by a high proportion of other interest bearing liabilities such as derivatives, 
trading liabilities, and long-term funding. In the pre-crisis period, this cluster was the smallest 
including only 78 banks (18%), whereas in the crisis period this cluster grew to 101 
institutions (22%). The cluster members include Dexia, KBC, BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, 
Société Générale, Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, Intesa Sanpaolo, UniCredit, Santander, 
ING, UBS, Credit Suisse, HSBC, Royal Bank of Scotland, Barclays, JP Morgan Chase, 
Citibank, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley among others. 
 
The remaining two clusters represent traditional banking models. The main characteristics are 
a high proportion of loans to households, companies, and total earning assets with deposits as 
the primary source of funding. However, the first model, C1, shows more loans and advances 
to banks in total earning assets and more deposits and short-term funding than cluster C3. 
Thus, C1 represents a more specialized structure. Cluster C3 is treated as a diversified model 
but with traditional sources of funding. Cluster C3 is also more numerous than C1 – in the 
pre-crisis period, C3 was composed of 121 banks (28%) and, in the crisis years, 178 banks 
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(40%). Cluster C1 is represented by 91 (21%) and only 59 (13%) institutions in the pre-crisis 
and crisis periods, respectively. Finally, examples of cluster members for C3 include Wells 
Fargo, Washington Mutual, Capital One, and National City Corporation in the US, Korean 
KB and Woori Finance, Norwegian DNB, Italian Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, and Banco 
Comercial Portuguęs among others. Cluster C1 is composed of Canadian Scotiabank, Bank of 
New York Mellon, Banco do Brasil, Bank of China, and other Chinese banks including Bank 
of Communications, China Merchants Bank, China CITIC Bank, and Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank. 
 
The results of clustering using both earning asset structure and funding structure are applied 
further in our analyses. We label models C1, C2, C3, and C4 as specialized, investment, 
diversified, and trader, respectively.  
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3. The)empirical)effect)of)banking)business)models)on)risk))
 
In this section we present the empirical results on the link between various banking business 
models and their individual and systemic risk.   
 
3.1. Banking)business)models)and)their)individual)risk))
 
Tables 4 and 5 present the results on the link between a business model and individual risk 
measures; that is, EQUITY and TIER1. In sub-specifications b, c, and d for each model, we 
present the results only for the business model dummies and the constant term, whereas other 
values are the same as sub-specification a. 
[Table 4 about here] 
[Table 5 about here] 
In specifications explaining EQUITY, we find that the diversified model is less risky than the 
trader model in the pre-crisis period, and that the diversified model is less risky than the 
specialized and trader model in the crisis period. This supports the evidence that 
diversification pays off in the banking industry and allows banks to reduce their individual 
risk (Brunnermeier et al., 2012; Wheelock and Wilson, 2012). The results for the TIER1 
specifications however present a distinct picture. In the pre-crisis period, the diversified model 
was statistically significantly the poorest, whereas other banking business models exhibit a 
positive effect on the TIER1 ratio. In contrast, in the crisis years, the investment model was 
statistically significantly the most capitalized in terms of TIER1, whereas other banking 
business models performed poorly with respect to the TIER1 ratio. This supports the evidence 
of Gorton (2009) and Diamond and Rajan (2011) who found that the TIER1 ratio understated 
the deterioration of bank assets because of book value treatment of capital in the TIER1 ratio. 
Thus, we can conclude that the TIER1 capital ratio does not match the equity-to-assets ratio 
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as a measure of individual risk. The equity ratio as a measure of bank’s individual risk shows 
that, in the crisis period, the diversified model was superior in terms of equity, but the model 
with a nontraditional funding structure (investment) led in terms of the TIER1 ratio.  
 
Finally, in specifications (1) and (2) of both tables we find that, in the pre-crisis period, 
smaller, more profitable banks with higher liquidity had a healthier equity-to-assets ratio and 
Tier 1 capital ratio. The estimated coefficients for those variables were statistically significant 
at levels below 1%. However, specifications (3) and (4) show that all coefficients for these 
variables, except for L.LN_A, lack statistical significance for the crisis years. Thus, we can 
conclude that bank size matters during a crisis and negatively influences individual risk 
measures. This supports the “too big to fail” doctrine and a reduction in market discipline 
(Hett and Schmidt, 2013; Laeven et al., 2014).  
3.2. Banking)business)models)and)their)systemic)risk)
 
 
Table 6 presents the estimation results for the models explaining systemic risk generated by 
banks.  
[Table 6 about here] 
Specifications (2) and (4) document that the estimation results for the banking model 
dummies slightly differ between both sub-periods. First, in the pre-crisis period, we find that 
traditional banks generate statistically lower systemic risk than non-traditional banks, but we 
do not find statistically significant differences between the banking group models (traditional 
versus non-traditional). Given that the asset structure within the individual banking groups is 
the same and that liability structure is distinct, we argue that, in the pre-crisis period, systemic 
risk is mainly associated with earning asset structure. This implies a high interconnectedness 
between banks holding similar assets. Cifuentes et al. (2005) and Brunnermeier and Sannikov 
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(2014) suggest the contagion effect from asset price changes in an environment where banks 
hold similar assets.  
 
Specifications (3) and (4) show a slight change in the situation during the crisis years. The 
nontraditional trader model (predominantly funded by deposits) appears no worse than both 
traditional models (diversified and specialized); that is, the results suggest that the trader 
model is the least systemically risky, but the respective estimated coefficients are statistically 
insignificant. During the crisis period, we find that the investment model (nontraditional asset 
structure with non-deposits) was the riskiest from the perspective of stability of the whole 
financial system. Systemic risk generated by the investment model was greater than that of 
both traditional models and greater than the risk generated by the trader model with a 
nontraditional earning asset structure. Therefore, the results suggest that, in the recent crisis, 
systemic risk was linked to funding structure. This supports the research, which documents 
that the run on repo and the illiquidity of the interbank market was the origination of the 
financial crisis because these factors materialized bank losses (Gorton and Metrick, 2012). 
The banks that funded their asset by deposits were less exposed to the interbank context and 
were less affected by the financial crisis (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Ivashina and 
Scharfstein, 2010; Allen et al., 2014). Moreover, the low share of deposits in the investment 
model determined the high interconnectedness of banks from that business group, which 
resulted in their simultaneous problems during the crisis. The results for the trader model 
show that the nontraditional banking model could be ameliorated if backed by solid deposit 
funding. Finally, we can conclude that although the investment model is among the most 
systemically risky models even before the crisis, appropriate recognition of the source of its 
riskiness (which lies in its funding structure) was difficult at that time because, in the pre-
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crisis years, the trader model with a comparable earning asset structure similarly affected the 
expected systemic risk. 
 
Finally, we can find that larger banks with higher cost to income ratios and greater liquidity 
contributed more to the total expected capital shortfall in the financial system in the recent 
crisis. Moreover, a country’s high GDP growth rate expectedly hampers systemic risk 
(specifications (3) and (4)).  
3.3. Systemic)risk)of)banking)business)models)and)institutional)structure)
–)robustness)check)
 
The effect of banking models on systemic risk may also depend on a country’s institutional 
infrastructure (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Beltratti and Stultz, 2012). For example, 
banks operating in countries with developed capital markets will have greater exposure to 
capital market activity than banks from countries dependent on the banking sector. To check 
the robustness of our previous results, we re-estimated the models with additional institutional 
variables as regressors. The variables include the country’s bank asset concentration (Table 
7), the country’s bank deposits to GDP ratio (Table 8), and stock market capitalization to 
GDP (Table 9).  
[Table 7 about here] 
[Table 8 about here] 
[Table 9 about here] 
The results are almost the same as the baseline estimations from the previous sub-section, 
with one exception. In the pre-crisis specifications using the country’s bank deposits to GDP 
ratio as a regressor, we observe an additional statistically significant difference in the effect 
on systemic risk between both nontraditional models. Here, the investment model is the 
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riskiest followed by the trader model. This result may suggest that large banking sectors 
create large institutions.  
4. The#effect#of#banking#business#models#on#profitability#
 
Tables 10 and 11 present the results concerning the link between a banking business model 
and the profitability ratios ROA and ROE. 
[Table 10 about here] 
[Table 11 about here] 
The estimation results document that with respect to the banking model dummy coefficients, 
no statistical evidence of the influence of banking models on profitability ratios in the pre-
crisis period in terms of ROE can be found. However, some differences are observed if ROA 
is considered. The investment and diversified models outperformed the specialized and trader 
models. The results for the crisis period are statistically significant and dominant at levels 
below 1% in many cases. First, we find that an investment model (nontraditional funding with 
nontraditional earning asset structure) is the poorest. This result is consistent with Beltratti 
and Stulz (2012), who found that banks following the investment model were affected by the 
financial crisis to a greater extent because of significant losses from falling securities values. 
Additionally, Goh et al. (2015) found that banks with a significant portion of high-value 
securities experience greater losses because they were discounted. Second, specifications (4) 
of both tables show that the specialized and trader models generate the highest profits from 
their assets and equity (however, there is no statistical differences between the effects of these 
two business models on the profitability ratios). Interestingly, these two models are 
characterized by the highest proportion of deposits and short-term liabilities in the funding 
structure. Thus, accounting for completely different earning asset structures (traditional for 
the specialized model and nontraditional for the trader model) we might conclude that 
20 
 
performance in the recent crisis years was linked to a greater extent with the funding structure 
than the structure of earning assets. This suggests that stable financing allows trader banks to 
counteract the “fire sale” and thus to limit losses, whereas traditional banks continue to lend. 
This supports the recent evidence of Allen et al. (2014), who find that banks that are not 
dependent on deposit funding, or that experienced difficulty in attracting new depositors, 
exhibited the sharpest decline in lending during the financial crisis.    
 
Finally, the specification results document that smaller banks with superior cost-control and 
liquidity were more profitable in terms of ROA and ROE in both the pre-crisis and crisis 
period. The majority of the coefficients for the variables are statistically significant at levels 
below 1%. 
5. The)banking)business)models)and)the)nature)of)financial)crisis)in)
individual)countries)
 
 
The mortgage crisis affected not only banks but also economic situation of different countries. 
For example, the cost of the crisis in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the 
US, and the UK ranged from 3.5 of GDP to 18% of GDP, whereas in countries such as 
Austria, Italy, or Spain the cost amounted to approximately 1% to 2% of GDP. Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009), using a sample of several financial crises including the mortgage crisis, argued 
that downturns in capital markets during financial downturns are more severe than downturns 
in the real estate market, but are shorter-lived. Thus, countries with bank activities 
predominantly concentrated in capital markets should experience greater consequences of 
financial crises than countries with traditional banking models. However, we also expect that 
the effects would be of a lesser duration than in countries with traditional banking. Moreover, 
on a country level, Allen et al. (2012) found that countries with developed capital and banking 
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markets experience less contraction during financial crises than countries that rely solely on 
the banking sector. Consequently, the authors conclude that financial crises in countries 
dominated by banking sectors experience longer financial crises. Thus, based on this research, 
we try to assess how different banking strategies are linked with the countries they represent. 
To identify the most prevalent banking business model in a given country we rely on our bank 
clustering analysis. We assign a country a dominant banking model when a weighted share of 
banks in total banking sector asset falling into particular model is the highest. Our period 
covers the years of 2007 to 2012. Table 12 shows the dominant banking business models for 
all countries in our analysis.  
[Table 12 about here] 
Given banking business model in individual countries, we run cross-section regressions to 
explain the depth (DEPTH) and duration (DURAT) of the crisis for each country. Tables 13 
and 14 show the estimation results.  
[Table 13 about here] 
[Table 14 about here] 
For all specifications, the joint impact of all explanatory variables is statistically significant. 
However, the coefficients for all the institutional variables are statistically insignificant with 
the exception of stock market capitalization in the models explaining crisis duration. Here, we 
obtained negative coefficients, but their significance is natural; that is, a crisis is shorter when 
a stock exchange recovers earlier. In this case, a higher average relation of stock market 
capitalization to GDP between the years 2007 to 2012 is a result of earlier stock exchange 
recovery. In specifications for crisis depth (Table 13), we observe that many coefficients for 
the business model variables are statistically significant (mostly at levels below 1%). We find 
that the investment model generates the most crisis depth, the specialized model is the least 
risky, and the diversified model falls somewhere in-between these two models. These 
22 
 
observations are consistent with the results of our previous panel regressions, which 
suggested that a nontraditional funding structure (a main characteristic of the investment 
model) stimulated systemic risk in the recent crisis. Although the nontraditional funding of 
banks in a country intensifies crisis depth, it does not stimulate crisis duration. From Table 14, 
we conclude that the longest crisis duration was observed in countries with the specialized 
model. Moreover, the coefficient for the diversified model suggests that it also generated 
longer crises than both nontraditional models (the trader model and the investment model), 
but the results are statistically insignificant. In summary, we presume that the business model 
that generates the deepest crisis is responsible for a comparatively short crisis duration, and 
the least risky business model in terms of crisis depth was simultaneously the riskiest in terms 
of crisis duration. Figure 1 presents these observations and shows the expected changes in 
crisis depth and duration from a 30 percentage point increase in the country’s share of a given 
banking business model. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
6. Conclusions)and)policy)implications)
 
The recent liberalization and globalization trend in the banking industry has contributed to 
greater heterogeneity among banking business strategies. The range stretches from specialized 
lending models to diversified models and ends with investment and trader models. The 
differences between the models are reflected in both bank’s assets and their funding sources. 
This heterogeneity in banking strategies complicates the assessment of the individual effect of 
each strategy on financial crisis origination and propagation by regulators. We observe higher 
correlation between bank activities within certain models and lower levels of correlation in 
others.  
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Our results present important conclusions. First, we find that the asset structure was the main 
driver of systemic risk in the banking sector before the crisis. A high correlation of securities 
values between various banks determined the systemic risk for the banking sector. We find 
that, during the mortgage crisis, the funding structure was the main determinant of systemic 
risk. Consistent with other studies, we find that the investment model carried the most 
systemic risk. The model’s systemic risk was greater than that of traditional banks and trader 
banks; that is, banks with an investment structure based on assets, but funded by deposits. The 
fire sale and subsequent illiquidity problems materialized bank losses from a decrease in asset 
values. However, the recognition of the source of investment model riskiness (which lies in 
the funding structure) was difficult at that time because, in the pre-crisis years, the trader 
model with a comparable earning asset structure similarly affected the expected systemic risk. 
Moreover, we find that the investment model generates the most depth to a crisis, whereas the 
traditional model is the least risky, and the diversified model lies somewhere between the 
two. Interestingly, although a nontraditional funding structure intensifies crisis depth, it does 
not stimulate crisis duration. The results suggest that the longest crisis occurred in countries 
with traditional banking models; that is, banks that are the most traditional in their asset and 
funding structure. Thus, the results support the hypothesis that the deepest crisis was 
responsible for a comparatively short crisis duration; however, the least risky model in terms 
of crisis depth simultaneously carried the most risk in terms of crisis duration.  
  
The implications of the findings for policy-makers are that regulators should consider the 
simultaneous structure of banks assets and liabilities in assessment of banks’ strategies. Only 
a specific combination creates risk in the banking sector. Thus, regulating asset structure 
individually from its funding sources is not likely to ensure banking sector stability. 
Consequently, greater emphasis should be placed on bank liability structure rather than solely 
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on asset structure. Moreover, precise measures for banking sector stability are required. 
Concentrating solely on asset risk may not fully reflect the true risk of the banking sector, as 
our results on the trader and investment model show. Such measures should simultaneously 
include the asset and liability structure of banks and their correlations. Finally, diversification 
matters and should be encouraged in the banking sector because it ensures greater stability. In 
turn, the specialization models generate some risk. Thus, restricting banking sector activities, 
paradoxically, might imply greater risk in global banking sector.   
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the clustering variables 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Median 5th perc. 25th perc. 75th perc. 95th perc. 
A_LOANS 0.623 0.192 0.651 0.217 0.516 0.760 0.882 
A_BANKS 0.111 0.116 0.079 0.003 0.032 0.151 0.319 
A_SECUR 0.246 0.156 0.225 0.044 0.133 0.324 0.519 
A_OTHER 0.024 0.060 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.126 
F_DEPO 0.811 0.184 0.872 0.424 0.743 0.941 0.978 
F_OIBL 0.133 0.160 0.073 0.000 0.023 0.189 0.445 
F_NIBL 0.056 0.082 0.032 0.008 0.019 0.059 0.170 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for banks’ characteristics and country’s characteristics 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Median 5th perc. 25th perc. 75th perc. 95th perc. 
Bank-level variables 
EQUITY 0.090 0.068 0.078 0.033 0.055 0.106 0.170 
TIER1 0.112 0.045 0.102 0.062 0.081 0.130 0.196 
ROA 0.011 0.018 0.009 -0.003 0.005 0.015 0.030 
ROE 0.121 0.127 0.125 -0.025 0.070 0.183 0.284 
CI 0.561 0.180 0.556 0.295 0.456 0.651 0.831 
LIQUIDITY 0.262 0.237 0.197 0.036 0.104 0.343 0.712 
LN_A 10.267 1.827 10.059 7.550 9.102 11.347 13.648 
SRISK 2.323 17.388 -0.159 -8.611 -1.510 1.266 23.035 
Country-specific variables 
CONCT 0.674 0.198 0.682 0.337 0.522 0.844 0.984 
DEPO 0.758 0.606 0.581 0.173 0.378 0.957 2.068 
GDP 0.036 0.039 0.036 -0.028 0.016 0.057 0.093 
STMRKT 0.722 0.675 0.554 0.113 0.297 0.946 1.882 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Identification of banking business models using clustering analysis 
The data present the clustering analysis using k-medoid approach. The methodology allows us to group banks 
with similar asset or/and liability structure into the same cluster. It considers the minimal distance between given 
financial variables among banks within one cluster using Euclidean distance. Our analysis limits to four financial 
variables representing bank asset structure (panel A) and four variables representing the liability structure (B). 
The panel C has been estimated based on asset and liability structures simultaneously. The clustering covers 
years of 2000-2006 for pre-crisis period and 2007-2012 for crisis period.  
A. Clustering with the use of earning assets’ structure 
 Financial variables cluster A1 cluster A2 cluster A3 cluster A4 
Medoids 
A_LOANS 0.576 0.466 0.784 0.575 
A_BANKS 0.201 0.122 0.051 0.063 
A_SECUR 0.219 0.264 0.152 0.363 
A_OTHER 0.005 0.148 0.013 0.000 
Clusters’ 
sizes 
pre-crisis period  123 25 141 144 
crisis period  86 51 217 104 
total 209 76 358 248 
B. Clustering with the use of funding’s structure 
 Financial variables cluster B1 cluster B2 cluster B3 cluster B4 
Medoids 
F_DEPO 0.935 0.779 0.486 0.362 
F_OIBL 0.035 0.178 0.427 0.106 
F_NIBL 0.030 0.044 0.086 0.532 
Clusters’ 
sizes 
pre-crisis period 253 134 42 7 
crisis period 235 145 67 9 
total 488 279 109 16 
C. Clustering with the use of earning assets’ and funding’s structure 
 Financial variables cluster C1 cluster C2 cluster C3 cluster C4 
Medoids 
 
A_LOANS 0.574 0.620 0.768 0.617 
A_BANKS 0.242 0.117 0.058 0.054 
A_SECUR 0.172 0.204 0.164 0.329 
A_OTHER 0.012 0.060 0.010 0.000 
F_DEPO 0.907 0.591 0.837 0.936 
F_OIBL 0.048 0.296 0.124 0.025 
F_NIBL 0.045 0.113 0.039 0.039 
Clusters’ 
sizes 
pre-crisis period 91 78 121 136 
crisis period 59 101 178 112 
total 150 179 299 248 
Table 4.  Impact of banking business models on equity to total assets ratio 
The data present bank-level estimations based on GLS regressions with a random effect. Bank-specific characteristics appear as lagged variables. Banking business models 
are represented by dummy variables. Robust standard errors that control for clustering at the bank-level are reported in brackets. The symbols *, represent statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.**, and ***, respectively.  
 pre-crisis period (2000-2006) crisis period (2007-2012) 
 (1) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (3) (4a) (4b) (4c) (4d) 
 EQUITY EQUITY EQUITY EQUITY EQUITY EQUITY EQUITY EQUITY EQUITY EQUITY 
L.ROA 0.479*** 0.500***    0.104 0.0881    
 (0.114) (0.121)    (0.0931) (0.0909)    L.CI -0.0133* -0.0151**    -0.00218 -0.00763    
 (0.00755) (0.00762)    (0.00669) (0.00677)    L.LIQUIDITY 0.0201*** 0.0207***    0.00602 0.00125    
 (0.00641) (0.00645)    (0.00512) (0.00437)    L.LN_A -0.0105*** -0.0104***    -0.00893*** -0.00787***    
 (0.00181) (0.00189)    (0.00141) (0.00125)    GDP 0.0928*** 0.0937***    0.00247 0.000824    
  (0.0318) (0.0322)    (0.0108) (0.0101)    
L.SPECIALIZED   
-0.00712 -0.00667 0.00610   -0.00505 -0.00759*** -0.00276 
   
(0.00980) (0.00494) (0.00501)   (0.00383) (0.00261) (0.00247) 
L.INVESTMENT   0.00712  
0.000453 0.0132  0.00505  -0.00255 0.00229 
  (0.00980)  
(0.00798) (0.00867)  (0.00383)  (0.00344) (0.00385) 
L.DIVERSIFIED   0.00667 -0.000453  
0.0128***  0.00759*** 0.00255  0.00483** 
  (0.00494) (0.00798)  
(0.00443)  (0.00261) (0.00344)  (0.00238) 
L.TRADER   -0.00610 -0.0132 -0.0128***  
 0.00276 -0.00229 -0.00483**  
   (0.00501) (0.00867) (0.00443)  
 (0.00247) (0.00385) (0.00238)  
Constant 0.183*** 0.179*** 0.186*** 0.186*** 0.173*** 0.182*** 0.170*** 0.175*** 0.178*** 0.173*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0188) (0.0253) (0.0196) (0.0195) (0.0149) (0.0140) (0.0157) (0.0140) (0.0139) 
Number of obs. 2,427 2,381    2,583 2,511    Number of banks 432 421    458 450    Chi-squared 80.18*** 116.5***    46.06*** 67.64***    R-squared 0.255 0.297    0.222 0.239    
Table 5. Impact of banking business models on Tier 1 ratio 
The data present bank-level estimations based on GLS regressions with a random effect. Bank-specific characteristics appear as lagged variables. Banking business models 
are represented by dummy variables. Robust standard errors that control for clustering at the bank-level are reported in brackets. The symbols *, represent statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.**, and ***, respectively. 
 pre-crisis period (2000-2006) crisis period (2007-2012) 
 (1) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (3) (4a) (4b) (4c) (4d) 
 TIER1 TIER1 TIER1 TIER1 TIER1 TIER1 TIER1 TIER1 TIER1 TIER1 
L.ROA 0.724*** 0.743***    -0.249 -0.209    
 (0.119) (0.120)    (0.153) (0.164)    L.CI -0.00265 -0.00130    0.00365 -0.00237    
 (0.00893) (0.00890)    (0.0131) (0.0128)    L.LIQUIDITY 0.0338*** 0.0308***    0.00715 0.00204    
 (0.00777) (0.00790)    (0.00876) (0.00867)    L.LN_A -0.00925*** -0.00861***    -0.00606*** -0.00681***    
 (0.00121) (0.00148)    (0.00128) (0.00136)    GDP -0.0570 -0.0775    0.0116 0.00713    
  (0.0481) (0.0506)    (0.0178) (0.0176)    
L.SPECIALIZED  
  
0.0142 0.0256*** 0.00625   -0.0210*** -0.00353 -0.00503 
   
(0.00880) (0.00653) (0.00672)   (0.00598) (0.00402) (0.00431) 
L.INVESTMENT  
 
-0.0142 
 
0.0114* -0.00797  0.0210***  0.0174*** 0.0159*** 
  
(0.00880) 
 
(0.00675) (0.00814)  (0.00598)  (0.00493) (0.00559) 
L.DIVERSIFIED  
 
-0.0256*** -0.0114* 
 
-0.0193***  0.00353 -0.0174***  -0.00150 
  
(0.00653) (0.00675) 
 
(0.00506)  (0.00402) (0.00493)  (0.00331) 
L.TRADER  
 
-0.00625 0.00797 0.0193*** 
 
 0.00503 -0.0159*** 0.00150  
  
 
(0.00672) (0.00814) (0.00506) 
 
 (0.00431) (0.00559) (0.00331)  
Constant 0.190*** 0.195*** 0.181*** 0.170*** 0.189*** 0.182*** 0.186*** 0.207*** 0.190*** 0.191*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0177) (0.0213) (0.0176) (0.0163) (0.0139) (0.0147) (0.0165) (0.0145) (0.0143) 
Number of obs. 1,740 1,716    2,147 2,099    Number of banks 361 357    410 403    Chi-squared 122.6*** 179.7***    29.06*** 40.89***    R-squared 0.304 0.324    0.0424 0.0347    
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Table 6. Impact of banking business models on systemic risk generated by banks 
The data present bank-level estimations based on GLS regressions with a random effect. Bank-specific characteristics appear as lagged variables. Banking business models 
are represented by dummy variables. Robust standard errors that control for clustering at the bank-level are reported in brackets. The symbols *, represent statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.**, and ***, respectively. 
 pre-crisis period (2000-2006) crisis period (2007-2012) 
 (1) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (3) (4a) (4b) (4c) (4d) 
 SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK 
L.ROA -18.44 -18.32*    26.90 29.33    
 (11.61) (11.02)    (21.84) (22.72)    L.CI 1.774* 1.472    4.214** 3.806**    
 (0.974) (0.920)    (1.827) (1.785)    L.LIQUIDITY 3.111** 2.697*    5.389*** 3.565*    
 (1.403) (1.449)    (2.033) (1.989)    L.EQUITY -23.63*** -21.99***    -3.883 -9.856    
 (6.032) (5.576)    (9.769) (11.53)    L.LN_A -0.127 -0.305    6.407*** 6.017***    
 (0.537) (0.559)    (0.837) (0.843)    
GDP -15.70*** -15.50***    -23.67*** -22.33***    
  (4.150) (4.143)    (5.799) (6.256)    
L.SPECIALIZED 
  
-4.965*** -0.497 -2.942***   -5.432** 0.986 0.877 
   
(1.734) (1.085) (1.100)   (2.674) (1.554) (2.598) 
L.INVESTMENT  
 
4.965*** 
 
4.468** 2.023  5.432**  6.418** 6.309** 
  
(1.734) 
 
(1.826) (1.973)  (2.674)  (2.600) (2.661) 
L.DIVERSIFIED  
 
0.497 -4.468** 
 
-2.445**  -0.986 -6.418**  -0.109 
  
(1.085) (1.826) 
 
(1.095)  (1.554) (2.600)  (1.495) 
L.TRADER  
 
2.942*** -2.023 2.445** 
 
 -0.877 -6.309** 0.109  
  
 
(1.100) (1.973) (1.095) 
 
 (2.598) (2.661) (1.495)  
Constant 1.491 1.432 6.397 1.929 4.374 -65.93*** -61.16*** -55.73*** -62.14*** -62.03*** 
 (5.282) (5.718) (5.975) (5.589) (5.270) (8.966) (9.073) (9.414) (9.192) (8.757) 
Number of obs. 1,680 1,650    2,374 2,314    Number of banks 352 346    445 437    Chi-squared 40.12*** 48.07***    86.20*** 115.4***    R-squared 0.0911 0.0929    0.327 0.341    
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Table 7. Robustness check: Impact of banking business models on systemic risk after controlling for a country’s bank asset 
concentration 
The data present bank-level estimations based on GLS regressions with a random effect. Bank-specific characteristics appear as lagged variables. Banking business models 
are represented by dummy variables. Robust standard errors that control for clustering at the bank-level are reported in brackets. The symbols *, represent statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.**, and ***, respectively. 
 pre-crisis period (2000-2006) crisis period (2007-2012) 
 (1) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (3) (4a) (4b) (4c) (4d) 
 SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK 
L.ROA -18.23 -18.17    38.82 39.86    
 (11.86) (11.25)    (24.24) (25.73)    L.CI 1.812* 1.503    5.693*** 5.248***    
 (1.010) (0.954)    (2.059) (2.031)    L.LIQUIDITY 3.321** 2.877**    6.133** 4.019*    
 (1.420) (1.467)    (2.419) (2.407)    L.EQUITY -24.35*** -22.56***    -1.217 -5.784    
 (6.230) (5.745)    (10.17) (12.66)    L.LN_A -0.0997 -0.268    6.637*** 6.164***    
 (0.542) (0.566)    (0.890) (0.892)    
GDP -16.08*** -15.97***    -23.76*** -22.64***    
  (4.195) (4.197)    (5.631) (6.040)    
CONCT -0.0692 -0.0381    0.663 -1.948    
 (1.244) (1.281)    (3.004) (3.540)    
L.SPECIALIZED 
  
-4.843*** -0.480 -2.921**   -6.304** 0.525 0.375 
   
(1.738) (1.098) (1.135)   (2.601) (1.408) (2.419) 
L.INVESTMENT  
 
4.843*** 
 
4.363** 1.922  6.304**  6.829** 6.679** 
  
(1.738) 
 
(1.838) (2.012)  (2.601)  (2.792) (2.928) 
L.DIVERSIFIED  
 
0.480 -4.363** 
 
-2.442**  -0.525 -6.829**  -0.150 
  
(1.098) (1.838) 
 
(1.112)  (1.408) (2.792)  (1.514) 
L.TRADER  
 
2.921** -1.922 2.442** 
 
 -0.375 -6.679** 0.150  
  
 
(1.135) (2.012) (1.112) 
 
 (2.419) (2.928) (1.514)  
Constant 1.217 -18.17 -18.17 -18.17 -18.17 -70.11*** -63.45*** -57.15*** -63.98*** -63.83*** 
 (5.453) (11.25) (11.25) (11.25) (11.25) (9.682) (10.30) (10.50) (10.12) (9.386) 
Number of obs. 1,640 1,610    1,927 1,880    Number of banks 351 345    436 429    Chi-squared 40.35*** 47.85***    99.06*** 123.7***    R2 0.0915 0.0957    0.327 0.345    
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Table 8. Robustness check: Impact of banking business models on systemic risk after controlling for a country’s bank deposits to GDP 
The data present bank-level estimations based on GLS regressions with a random effect. Bank-specific characteristics appear as lagged variables. Banking business models 
are represented by dummy variables. Standard errors that control for clustering at the bank-level are reported in brackets. The symbols *, represent statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.**, and ***, respectively. 
 pre-crisis period (2000-2006) crisis period (2007-2012) 
 (1) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (3) (4a) (4b) (4c) (4d) 
 SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK 
L.ROA -15.61 -14.99    45.83* 48.05*    
 (10.85) (10.01)    (23.44) (25.02)    L.CI 1.680* 1.396    6.345*** 5.914***    
 (0.908) (0.849)    (1.825) (1.758)    L.LIQUIDITY 2.562** 1.835    6.263*** 4.244*    
 (1.286) (1.316)    (2.223) (2.213)    L.EQUITY -21.88*** -20.24***    0.571 -3.492    
 (5.962) (5.316)    (9.704) (12.29)    L.LN_A -0.188 -0.486    5.601*** 5.199***    
 (0.515) (0.531)    (0.847) (0.836)    
GDP -16.76*** -16.13***    -18.23*** -16.69***    
  (4.230) (4.125)    (4.911) (5.147)    
DEPO 2.181* 2.827***    4.389** 4.518**    
 (1.131) (1.094)    (1.797) (1.827)    
L.SPECIALIZED 
  
-6.716*** -0.329 -2.800**   -5.533** 0.631 0.911 
   
(1.690) (1.196) (1.184)   (2.686) (1.513) (2.442) 
L.INVESTMENT  
 
6.716*** 
 
6.387*** 3.916**  5.533**  6.163** 6.444** 
  
(1.690) 
 
(1.730) (1.756)  (2.686)  (2.752) (2.727) 
L.DIVERSIFIED  
 
0.329 -6.387*** 
 
-2.471**  -0.631 -6.163**  0.281 
  
(1.196) (1.730) 
 
(1.054)  (1.513) (2.752)  (1.413) 
L.TRADER  
 
2.800** -3.916** 2.471** 
 
 -0.911 -6.444** -0.281  
  
 
(1.184) (1.756) (1.054) 
 
 (2.442) (2.727) (1.413)  
Constant 0.694 1.135 7.851 1.464 3.935 -63.78*** -59.18*** -53.65*** -59.82*** -60.10*** 
 (4.948) (5.451) (5.694) (5.265) (4.959) (9.541) (9.725) (9.826) (9.706) (9.176) 
Number of obs. 1,589 1,559    1,876 1,829    Number of banks 332 326    426 419    Chi-squared 42.22*** 51.04***    81.95*** 104.6***    R-squared 0.0954 0.130    0.297 0.312    
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Table 9. Robustness check: Impact of banking business models on systemic risk after controlling for a country’s stock market 
capitalization to GDP 
The data present bank-level estimations based on GLS regressions with a random effect. Bank-specific characteristics appear as lagged variables. Banking business models 
are represented by dummy variables. Standard errors that control for clustering at the bank-level are reported in brackets. The symbols *, represent statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.**, and ***, respectively.  
 pre-crisis period (2000-2006) crisis period (2007-2012) 
 (1) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (3) (4a) (4b) (4c) (4d) 
 SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK 
L.ROA -15.81 -15.91    48.78** 48.62*    
 (10.93) (10.51)    (23.66) (25.23)    L.CI 1.207 0.990    5.151** 4.678**    
 (0.958) (0.917)    (2.022) (2.000)    L.LIQUIDITY 2.928** 2.570*    6.749*** 4.570*    
 (1.425) (1.475)    (2.493) (2.463)    L.EQUITY -22.64*** -21.33***    -5.716 -9.814    
 (6.228) (5.868)    (10.24) (12.68)    L.LN_A 0.149 -0.0190    6.354*** 5.920***    
 (0.572) (0.597)    (0.885) (0.885)    
GDP -13.26*** -13.39***    -17.79*** -16.72***    
  (3.985) (3.984)    (4.679) (5.084)    
STMRKT -2.852*** -2.652***    -3.595*** -3.442***    
 (0.556) (0.554)    (0.912) (0.930)    
L.SPECIALIZED 
  
-4.584*** -0.710 -2.640**   -5.817** 0.869 0.429 
   
(1.772) (1.221) (1.178)   (2.605) (1.525) (2.384) 
L.INVESTMENT  
 
4.584*** 
 
3.874** 1.944  5.817**  6.686** 6.245** 
  
(1.772) 
 
(1.868) (1.965)  (2.605)  (2.671) (2.723) 
L.DIVERSIFIED  
 
0.710 -3.874** 
 
-1.930*  -0.869 -6.686**  -0.441 
  
(1.221) (1.868) 
 
(1.104)  (1.525) (2.671)  (1.399) 
L.TRADER  
 
2.640** -1.944 1.930* 
 
 -0.429 -6.245** 0.441  
  
 
(1.178) (1.965) (1.104) 
 
 (2.384) (2.723) (1.399)  
Constant 1.335 1.032 5.616 1.742 3.672 -63.41*** -58.52*** -52.70*** -59.39*** -58.95*** 
 (5.456) (5.982) (6.208) (5.769) (5.501) (9.359) (9.625) (9.747) (9.541) (8.915) 
Number of obs. 1,627 1,597    1,937 1,890    Number of banks 338 332    436 429    Chi-squared 64.66*** 65.56***    89.24*** 114.7***    R-squared 0.0658 0.0804    0.308 0.323    
 
Table 10. Impact of banking business models on ROA 
The data present bank-level estimations based on GLS regressions with a random effect. Bank-specific characteristics appear as lagged variables. Banking business models 
are presented by dummy variables. Robust standard errors that control for clustering at the bank-level are reported in brackets. The symbols *, represent statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.**, and ***, respectively. 
 pre-crisis period (2000-2006) crisis period (2007-2012) 
 (1) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (3) (4a) (4b) (4c) (4d) 
 ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
L.EQUITY 0.0610** 0.0634**    0.0943*** 0.106***    
 (0.0300) (0.0321)    (0.0270) (0.0338)    L.CI -0.0128*** -0.0134***    -0.0150*** -0.0154***    
 (0.00403) (0.00411)    (0.00284) (0.00285)    L.LIQUIDITY 0.00521** 0.00485**    0.00873*** 0.00960***    
 (0.00226) (0.00228)    (0.00174) (0.00218)    L.LN_A -0.00107** -0.00119**    -0.00149*** -0.00129***    
 (0.000424) (0.000493)    (0.000294) (0.000307)    GDP 0.122*** 0.124***    0.0669*** 0.0592***    
  (0.0213) (0.0219)    (0.0105) (0.00987)    
L.SPECIALIZED 
  
-0.00484* -0.00435** -0.00101   0.00248 0.00266*** -0.000747 
   
(0.00263) (0.00198) (0.00134)   (0.00193) (0.001000) (0.000909) 
L.INVESTMENT  
 
0.00484* 
 
0.000497 0.00383*  -0.00248  0.000183 -0.00323* 
  
(0.00263) 
 
(0.00187) (0.00219)  (0.00193)  (0.00224) (0.00190) 
L.DIVERSIFIED  
 
0.00435** -0.000497 
 
0.00333**  -0.00266*** -0.000183  -0.00341*** 
  
(0.00198) (0.00187) 
 
(0.00155)  (0.001000) (0.00224)  (0.000831) 
L.TRADER  
 
0.00101 -0.00383* -0.00333** 
 
 0.000747 0.00323* 0.00341***  
  
 
(0.00134) (0.00219) (0.00155) 
 
 (0.000909) (0.00190) (0.000831)  
Constant 0.0181*** 0.0169** 0.0217*** 0.0212*** 0.0179*** 0.0206*** 0.0191*** 0.0167*** 0.0165*** 0.0199*** 
 (0.00655) (0.00659) (0.00762) (0.00739) (0.00670) (0.00409) (0.00438) (0.00490) (0.00424) (0.00416) 
Number of obs. 2,415 2,369    2,574 2,502    Number of banks 432 421    458 450    Chi-squared 86.27*** 102.7***    192.6*** 219.6***    R-squared 0.269 0.287    0.334 0.341    
Table 11. Impact of banking business models on ROE 
The data present bank-level estimations based on GLS regressions with a random effect. Bank-specific characteristics appear as lagged variables. Banking business models 
are represented by dummy variables. Robust standard errors that control for clustering at the bank-level are reported in brackets. The symbols *, represent statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.**, and ***, respectively. 
 pre-crisis period (2000-2006) crisis period (2007-2012) 
 (1) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (3) (4a) (4b) (4c) (4d) 
 ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE 
L.EQUITY -0.368*** -0.396***    -0.145 -0.0855 -0.0855 -0.0855 -0.0855 
 (0.110) (0.122)    (0.0885) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) L.CI -0.112*** -0.115***    -0.168*** -0.168*** -0.168*** -0.168*** -0.168*** 
 (0.0270) (0.0272)    (0.0308) (0.0322) (0.0322) (0.0322) (0.0322) L.LIQUIDITY 0.0551*** 0.0601***    0.0767*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 
 (0.0116) (0.0142)    (0.0199) (0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0204) L.LN_A -0.00347 -0.00379    -0.0130*** -0.00966*** -0.00966*** -0.00966*** -0.00966*** 
 (0.00225) (0.00300)    (0.00222) (0.00230) (0.00230) (0.00230) (0.00230) GDP 0.859*** 0.873***    0.765*** 0.679*** 0.679*** 0.679*** 0.679*** 
  (0.134) (0.140)    (0.0881) (0.0860) (0.0860) (0.0860) (0.0860) 
L.SPECIALIZED 
  
-0.00817 -0.0117 -0.0113   0.0522*** 0.0265*** -0.000422 
   
(0.0166) (0.0106) (0.00991)   (0.0125) (0.00904) (0.00989) 
L.INVESTMENT  
 
0.00817 
 
-0.00352 -0.00311  -0.0522***  -0.0258** -0.0527*** 
  
(0.0166) 
 
(0.0162) (0.0173)  (0.0125)  (0.0127) (0.0118) 
L.DIVERSIFIED  
 
0.0117 0.00352 
 
0.000416  -0.0265*** 0.0258**  -0.0269*** 
  
(0.0106) (0.0162) 
 
(0.00990)  (0.00904) (0.0127)  (0.00842) 
L.TRADER  
 
0.0113 0.00311 -0.000416 
 
 0.000422 0.0527*** 0.0269***  
  
 
(0.00991) (0.0173) (0.00990) 
 
 (0.00989) (0.0118) (0.00842)  
Constant 0.217*** 0.212*** 0.220*** 0.224*** 0.224*** 0.303*** 0.280*** 0.228*** 0.253*** 0.280*** 
 (0.0335) (0.0382) (0.0462) (0.0392) (0.0368) (0.0341) (0.0377) (0.0421) (0.0384) (0.0372) 
Number of obs. 2,407 2,361    2,551 2,479    Number of banks 431 420    458 450    Chi-squared 91.03*** 95.54***    198.0*** 233.8***    R-squared 0.148 0.154    0.244 0.255    
 
Table 12. Dominant banking business models in countries 
SPECIALIZED INVESTMENT DIVERSIFIED TRADER 
Brazil 
China 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Philippines 
Qatar 
Australia 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Argentina 
Austria 
Chile 
Colombia 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Greece 
Hungary 
Israel 
Kazakhstan 
Malaysia 
Norway 
Peru 
Poland 
Romania 
Russia 
Singapore 
South Korea 
Thailand 
Ukraine 
United Arab Emirates 
Hong Kong 
India 
Indonesia 
Japan 
Lebanon 
Malta 
Mexico 
Pakistan 
Saudi Arabia 
Turkey 
Table 13. Impact of banking business models on a country’s crisis depth 
The data present cross-country estimations using OLS. Crisis depth has been calculated as a ratio of two values: 1) a difference between a country’s GDP growth rate in 2006 
and the lowest yearly GDP growth rate in the period of 2007-2012; and 2) a country’s GDP growth rate in 2006. Banking business models representative for individual 
countries are included as dummy variables. Standard errors that control for clustering at the country-level are reported in brackets. The symbols *, represent statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.**, and ***, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 DEPTH DEPTH DEPTH DEPTH DEPTH DEPTH DEPTH DEPTH DEPTH DEPTH 
DEPTH DEPTH 
SPECIALIZED   -2.000*** -1.255*** -1.286*  -1.960*** -1.217*** -1.027  -2.021*** -1.141*** -1.059 
  (0.370) (0.353) (0.708)  (0.393) (0.352) (0.651)  (0.368) (0.372) (0.721) 
INVESTMENT  1.767***  0.702** 0.686 1.707***  0.692** 0.898 1.772***  0.829*** 0.927 
 (0.372)  (0.278) (0.599) (0.407)  (0.273) (0.585) (0.385)  (0.244) (0.624) 
DIVERSIFIED  1.057*** -0.736**  -0.0328 0.990*** -0.737***  0.172 0.924** -0.870***  0.0692 
 (0.355) (0.282)  (0.611) (0.368) (0.272)  (0.543) (0.384) (0.243)  (0.664) 
TRADER  0.997 -0.767 -0.0474  0.691 -0.996 -0.293  0.735 -1.012 -0.178  
 (0.730) (0.646) (0.647)  (0.670) (0.599) (0.556)  (0.752) (0.655) (0.693)  
CONCT 0.905 0.822 0.871 0.906         
 (0.591) (0.595) (0.587) (0.589)         
DEPO     0.157 0.174 0.173 0.158     
      (0.289) (0.281) (0.283) (0.288)     
STMRKT         -0.101 -0.103 -0.0951 -0.101 
         (0.153) (0.159) (0.155) (0.152) 
Constant -0.0804 1.757*** 1.010** 1.002 0.466 2.173*** 1.465*** 1.276*** 0.686* 2.472*** 1.625*** 1.534** 
 (0.506) (0.512) (0.379) (0.696) (0.368) (0.332) (0.278) (0.409) (0.383) (0.210) (0.191) (0.644) 
Number of obs. 53 53 53 53 51 51 51 51 53 53 53 53 
R-squared 0.293 0.319 0.314 0.314 0.259 0.291 0.283 0.279 0.274 0.304 0.296 0.294 
F-test 8.162*** 9.390*** 9.302*** 9.219*** 7.049*** 9.298*** 9.135*** 8.667*** 7.766*** 10.07*** 9.828*** 10.10*** 
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Table 14. Impact of banking business models on a crisis duration in a country 
The data present cross-section estimations using OLS. Crisis duration has been defined as maximum of two values:  1) a number of years between 2006 and the last year with 
negative GDP growth rate; and 2) a number of years between 2006 and the year with the minimum GDP growth rate in the period of 2007-2012. Banking business models 
representative for individual countries are included as dummy variables. Standard errors that control for clustering at the country-level are reported in brackets. The symbols 
*, represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.**, and ***, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(11) (12) 
 DURAT DURAT DURAT DURAT DURAT DURAT DURAT DURAT DURAT DURAT DURAT DURAT 
SPECIALIZED  1.799*** 1.494** 1.766**  1.842*** 1.428** 2.056**  1.788** 1.645** 1.951** 
  (0.655) (0.680) (0.826)  (0.684) (0.686) (0.857)  (0.676) (0.691) (0.804) 
INVESTMENT  -1.525**  -0.265 -0.0192 -1.608**  -0.381 0.214 -1.532**  -0.117 0.166 
 (0.634)  (0.233) (0.417) (0.651)  (0.254) (0.446) (0.638)  (0.201) (0.382) 
DIVERSIFIED  -1.248* 0.320  0.271 -1.211* 0.415  0.617 -1.405** 0.157  0.306 
 (0.657) (0.240)  (0.425) (0.651) (0.251)  (0.499) (0.649) (0.203)  (0.436) 
TRADER  -1.416* 0.117 -0.181  -1.776** -0.187 -0.578  -1.627** -0.112 -0.247  
 (0.804) (0.439) (0.433)  (0.831) (0.463) (0.518)  (0.769) (0.392) (0.443)  
CONCT 0.710 0.788 0.747 0.725         
 (0.712) (0.716) (0.706) (0.700)         
DEPO     0.503 0.487 0.486 0.485     
      (0.339) (0.336) (0.339) (0.336)     
STMRKT         -0.193* -0.192* -0.196* -0.191* 
         (0.109) (0.107) (0.109) (0.108) 
Constant 4.053*** 2.444*** 2.764*** 2.533*** 4.179*** 2.572*** 2.968*** 2.372*** 4.768*** 3.213*** 3.354*** 3.064*** 
 (0.846) (0.517) (0.375) (0.515) (0.668) (0.345) (0.195) (0.490) (0.654) (0.175) (0.204) (0.393) 
Number of obs. 53 53 53 53 51 51 51 51 53 53 53 53 
R-squared 0.201 0.239 0.235 0.238 0.266 0.295 0.291 0.296 0.205 0.238 0.237 0.240 
F-test 1.922 2.529 2.491 2.531 1.947 2.236 2.199 2.231 1.881 2.082 2.075 2.074 
 
Figure 1. Expected changes in crisis depth and crisis duration due to 30 pp. increase in 
the country’s share of a given banking business model 
 
Each point in the figure represents expected increases in crisis depth and crisis duration in a country due to a 30 
pp. increase in a bank’s asset-weighted share of a given banking business model in total banking sector asset, 
and a simultaneous 10 pp. decrease in the share of each of the remaining three banking business models. The 
results were obtained with the use of regression results for the equations (2) from tables 13-14.  
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